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Inspectors from the Dutch Inspectorate of Education inspect primary schools, write inspection
reports on each inspected school, and make recommendations as to how each school can
improve. We test whether these inspections result in better school performance. Using a
ﬁxed-effects model, we ﬁnd evidence that school inspections do lead to measurably better school
performance. Our assessment of school performance is based on the Cito test scores of pupils in
their ﬁnal year of primary school. Therefore school improvement means increased Cito test
scores. The results indicate that the Cito test scores improve by 2% to 3% of a standard deviation
of the test score in the two years following an inspection. The arithmetic component shows the
largest improvement. Our estimates are the result of an analysis of two types of school
inspections performed between 1999 and 2002, where one type was more intensive than the
other. In one ﬁxed-effects model, we assume that the effect of the two types of school
inspections was the same. We cannot, however, be sure that the estimates from this model are
free from the problem of endogeneity bias. Therefore, we also obtain estimates for a less
restrictive ﬁxed-effects model. In this less restrictive model, we make use of the fact that a subset
of the more intensive school inspections occurs at a representative selection of primary schools.
Based on this smaller, essentially randomly drawn sample of schools, we can be conﬁdent that
these estimates of the effect of school inspections are free from endogeneity bias. Due to the
limited number of inspections at randomly selected schools, these estimates are not signiﬁcantly
different from zero. These estimates are, however, consistent with the effects found based on all
inspections. The less restrictive model also allows for the effect of the more intensive inspections
to differ from that for the less intensive ones. We ﬁnd evidence that the more intensive
inspections are responsible for larger increases in the Cito test scores than the less intensive ones.
Abstract in Dutch
De Inspectie van het Onderwijs bezoekt scholen in het primair onderwijs, schrijft op basis
daarvan een inspectieverslag en doet aanbevelingen om de prestaties te verbeteren. Deze studie
onderzoekt het effect van de schoolbezoeken van de Inspectie van het onderwijs aan scholen in
het basisonderwijs. Daarvoor wordt de verandering in de Citoscores vergeleken van scholen die
bezocht zijn door de Inspectie met de verandering bij scholen die niet zijn bezocht door de
Inspectie. De analyse is gebaseerd op een bestand van alle Citoscores in Nederland over de jaren
1999-2003. In de analyse wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen kortere en intensievere bezoeken
aan scholen. In de eerste twee jaren na het inspectiebezoek stijgen de Citoscores met ongeveer
2% tot 3% van een standaarddeviatie. De stijging is groter voor de intensievere bezoeken en in
rekenen. In de analyse is ook gekeken naar de verandering in een random steekproef die door de
Inspectie is getrokken voor het maken van het jaarlijkse Onderwijsverslag. Het voordeel van
3deze steekproef is dat deze aselect is getrokken, nadeel is dat het aantal bezoeken veel kleiner is.
Deze analyse geeft kleinere positieve effecten van inspectiebezoeken, die evenwel consistent zijn
met de eerdere bevindingen. Voor rekenen worden ook met deze aanpak positieve effecten
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A number of countries, mainly European ones, have governmental agencies to inspect schools.
The Dutch Inspectorate of Education inspects primary schools to ensure that the schools are
complying with Dutch educational laws. These inspections are, however, also intended to
improve the quality of the education the schools provide.
Dutch school inspectors write a report on each inspected school following an inspection and
make recommendations as to how each school can improve. In this paper we ask what effect, if
any, these school inspections have on the test scores of Dutch primary school pupils.
Using a number of model speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd evidence that school inspections do lead to
measurably better school performance. Our assessment of school performance is based on the
Cito test scores of pupils in their ﬁnal year of primary school. Therefore school improvement
means increased Cito test scores.
Our main ﬁnding is that school inspections lead to better performance of schools. In the ﬁrst
two years following an inspection test scores increase by 2% to 3% of a test score’s standard
deviation. The improvement in Dutch elementary schools is strongest in the area of arithmetic
and persists over the four years following an inspection that our data covers. For the three other
subject areas covered by the Cito test and for the test score total, the improvement is signiﬁcant
in the two years following an inspection. Thereafter the estimated effects are typically positive
and of similar magnitude to those in the ﬁrst two years, but not signiﬁcant.
In this paper we have also been able to look into the effectiveness of two different types of
inspections. The Dutch Inspectorate of Education carries out two types of inspections which
differ in intensity. The less intensive version (RST) takes approximately one day and the more
intensive version (IST) takes 2 to 3 days. In one of our model speciﬁcations, we assume that the
effect of these two types of school inspections was the same. In an alternative speciﬁcation, we
allow the effect of a school inspection to differ depending on whether the inspection was a less
intensive RST inspection, or a more intensive IST one. Our analysis also indicates that the more
intensive inspections produce larger improvements in school performance than the less intensive
ones.
Estimating the effect of school inspections on primary school performance is difﬁcult,
because inspectors may not randomly select which schools they inspect. School inspectors are
likely to visit poorly performing schools more often. They may also inspect schools for reasons
a researcher can not observe. This non-random selection can produce an endogeneity bias in the
estimates of the impact of school inspections. As a result, an estimated effect could actually be
due to correlation between unobserved heterogeneity in the quality of schools and the
inspectors’ decisions about which schools to inspect.
We use two approaches to overcome this bias. First, we estimate models that include ﬁxed
school effects using test scores over the period 1999 to 2003. These models control for
7unobserved school factors that are time invariant. This ensures that correlation between the
inspections and constant factors, such as the physical infrastructure of the school, will not bias
the estimates. In this approach only changes in a school’s quality over time can bias our
estimates if they are correlated with (but not caused) by the school inspections.
Our second approach also tries to rule out this possible bias. We exploit the fact that the
Dutch Inspectorate of Education inspects a random sample of schools in order to compile their
annual report on the state of Dutch education. In doing so, the inspectorate performs what is
essentially a controlled experiment in which the sample of schools that are inspected represents a
random experimental group. The advantage of this sample is that we can be more conﬁdent
about the estimates. However, the number of inspections at randomly selected schools is much
smaller than in the number of inspections we can use in the ﬁrst approach. The results for the
inspections at the randomly selected schools generally show an improvement in school
performance, but this improvement is usually not signiﬁcant.
81 Introduction
A number of countries, mainly European ones, have governmental agencies to inspect schools.
During these inspections, the inspectors evaluate the quality of the education the schools
provide. The end product of an inspection typically includes a set of recommendations designed
to improve the schools. Do these inspections succeed in improving the educational achievement
of primary school pupils?
This paper focuses on the effect of school inspections on test scores of pupils in Dutch
primary education. The Dutch Inspectorate of Education carries out two types of inspections
which differ in intensity. The less intensive version (RST) takes approximately one day and the
more intensive version (IST) takes two to three days. Estimating the effect of school inspections
on primary school performance is difﬁcult, because inspectors may not randomly select which
schools they inspect. School inspectors are likely to visit poorly performing schools more often.
They may also inspect schools for reasons a researcher can not observe. This non-random
selection can produce an endogeneity bias in the estimates of the impact of school inspections.
As a result, an estimated effect could actually be due to correlation between unobserved
heterogeneity in the quality of schools and the inspectors’ decisions about which schools to
inspect.
We use two approaches to overcome this bias. First, we estimate models that include ﬁxed
school effects using test scores over the period 1999 to 2003. These models control for
unobserved school factors that are time invariant. This ensures that correlation between the
inspections and constant factors, such as the physical infrastructure of the school, will not bias
the estimates. In this approach only changes in a school’s quality over time can bias our
estimates if they are correlated with (but not caused) by the school inspections. Our second
approach also tries to rule out this possible bias. We exploit the fact that the Dutch Inspectorate
of Education inspects a random sample of schools in order to compile their annual report on the
state of Dutch education. In doing so, the inspectorate performs what is essentially a controlled
experiment in which the sample of schools that are inspected represents a random experimental
group. The advantage of this sample is that we can be more conﬁdent about the estimates.
However, the number of inspections at randomly selected schools is much smaller than in the
number of inspections we can use in the ﬁrst approach.
Our study is related to research on accountability systems for schools. Many recent papers
investigate the effect of using public performance indicators in education, see for example Jacob
and Levitt (2003) and Figlio and Lucasc (2004). School inspections not only make schools
accountable but also aim to provide recommendations for school improvement. In the literature
various outcomes of school inspections have been studied, for instance Brimblecombe et al.
(1996) have looked at the effect on teaching strategies, or Chapman (2001) who have studied the
effect on changes in school policy. The literature on the effect of inspections visits on
9educational achievement is small and limited to studies for the UK. Three studies (Cullingford
et al. (1999), Wilcox and Gray (1996), and Shaw et al. (2003)) investigate the effect of visits by
the English Inspectorate, Ofsted, on examination results at secondary schools. All three studies
ﬁnd that Ofsted visits have a negative effect in the short term.The researchers suggest that this
effect might come from stress and the need to prepare thoroughly for inspection visits. It should
be noted that these studies control for observable differences between schools that are inspected
and those that are not. This approach has the disadvantage that the estimated effects can be
biased by unobserved differences between schools. In addition, these studies only estimated the
effect of school inspections one year after an inspection. Our study is most related to a recent
study by Rosenthal (2004). Using panel data on schools in British secondary education he also
ﬁnds that Ofsted-inspections actually result in a decrease in the standardized exam scores of the
students at the inspected schools. Our study extends previous research by using two approaches
of which one is based on a natural experiment. Moreover, we are able to estimate the effect of
inspections up to four years after an inspection.
Our main ﬁnding with the ﬁrst approach, using a ﬁxed effects model, is that school
inspections lead to better performance of schools. In the ﬁrst two years following an inspection,
test scores increase by 2% to 3% of a standard deviation. Our analysis indicates that the more
intensive inspections produce larger improvements in school performance than the less intensive
ones. The improvement in Dutch elementary schools is strongest in the area of arithmetic and
persists over the four years following an inspection that our data covers. For the three other
subject areas covered by the Cito test and for the test score total, the improvement is signiﬁcant
in the two years following an inspection. Thereafter the estimated effects are typically positive
and of similar magnitude to those in the ﬁrst two years, but not signiﬁcant.
With the second approach, based on the random sample drawn by the Dutch Inspectorate of
Education, we only ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects on the arithmetic test. For the other test components,
the estimates are not signiﬁcantly different from zero. These estimates are, however, consistent
with the overall results based on all the school inspections. The estimates are positive in the ﬁrst
two years following an inspection, and all estimates are positive and larger for the arithmetic
component than for the other components.
In the following section, we discuss school inspections as they are performed in the
Netherlands in more detail. Then, before presenting the results of our analysis, we will discuss
the data we use and how we model this data to obtain estimates of the effects of an inspection.
We conclude with a discussion of the ﬁndings.
102 School inspections in the Netherlands
One of the aims of the Nederlandse Inspectie van het Onderwijs, or the Dutch Inspectorate of
Education, is to improve the quality of school education in the Netherlands. To achieve this, the
inspectorate carries out inspections of primary schools. The school inspectors evaluate the
quality of the education each school provides and recommends improvements. A school
inspection usually takes two or three days and consist of questionnaires, observations of lessons
and pre-structured interviews with the principal, teachers, parents, and pupils. At the end of an
inspection, schools receive a report detailing its strengths and weaknesses. The inspection
reports are also published on the Internet, including a table with the central assessment results.
This is intended to make schools publicly accountable.
Since 1998, all primary schools have been inspected with a new and standardized evaluation
instrument. This instrument is similar to the instrument of other inspectorates. It has been
designed to assess primary schools based on student results and aspects of the educational
process such as the competencies of teachers, the learning time, the pedagogical climate, and the
management. Each school is assessed by a standard set of indicators. These consist of
questionnaires, observation instruments, and pre-structured interviews.
Dutch law stipulates two statutory tasks for the inspectorate. One of these is to inspect
schools. The other is to improve the quality of Dutch schools. The inspectorate aims to achieve
this latter goal via the inspections themselves, as well as through the public report, the school
quality card which follow an inspection. The assessment results and reports are designed to
improve school performance directly by stimulating changes in policy and teaching methods and
materials. An additional effect might come from follow-up activities of other parties involved,
activities often directed by the assessment results. Examples are special measures for poorly
performing schools and extra funding, support or control by local governments or school boards.
The treatment we are studying consists of the standardized school inspections, the public
assessment report and the follow-up activities. The inspections and assessment reports are
identical for every school, although there are differences in the assessment results. The
follow-up activities vary among schools and are part of the treatment in our study.
In the years 1998-2003, there were two types of inspections. The RST inspection was a
shorter version, and the IST, a more extensive one. Both versions were similar, but the more
extensive IST was based on more measures of educational quality. In general, the inspectorate
used the regular assessment instrument for all schools, while the extensive method was intended
to be used as an instrument for follow-up inspections at under-performing schools.1 The IST
inspections were also performed on a random sample of schools. This sample has been drawn by
1 However, in our analysis of the data, we were unable to ﬁnd evidence that the IST inspections we performed as a
follow-up at under-performing schools.
11the Inspectorate to compile the annual report on the state of Dutch education. We denote these
inspections as RIST. Table 2.1 lists the number of inspections of each type by year in our data.
Dutch primary education has approximately 7600 schools.
Table 2.1 Number of Inspections in Sample
Yeara
RIST ISTb All ISTc RST
1998 - 643 643 -
1999 370 285 456 1406
2000 181 171 369 1209
2001 199 84 305 825
2002 - 90 245 607
a RIST inspections are dated according to the school year in which the Dutch Inspectorate selected which schools were to receive a
RIST inspection. This selection was performed at the beginning of the school year. IST and RST inspections are dated according to the
calendar year in which the inspection report was completed.
b The reported number excludes all RIST inspections for which a report was completed during the calendar year.
c In any given year, the number of inspections for the RIST and the IST will not added up to the number of inspections in the ‘All IST’
column. This is due to the difference between the school year dating of the RIST and the calendar year dating of the IST.
The number of inspections listed in the table for the IST and RST inspections are dated after the
inspections took place. These dates indicate the calendar year in which the inspection report,
which followed the actual inspection, was completed. The number of IST and RIST inspections
do not add up to the total number of IST inspections due to the difference between the school
year dating of the RIST and the calendar year dating of the IST inspections.
According to the Dutch Inspectorate of Education, the selection of schools in the years 1998
and 2002 for the RIST inspections was not entirely random. We do not, therefore, separate the
RIST from the set of all IST inspections for these years. The RIST inspections in the years 1999,
2000, and 2001 were performed at randomly selected schools according to the Dutch
Inspectorate. We have performed logit regressions of these inspections on student and school
characteristics and the CITO test scores to conﬁrm that these inspections were in fact carried out
at randomly selected schools. We did not ﬁnd systematic differences between schools in the
random sample and schools that were not selected in this sample.
Finally, we note that the schools inspections are not uniformly distributed throughout the
sample period. There were in fact more inspections of all three types in 1999 than in the
following years. The set of all IST inspections and the RST inspections show a steady decline in
numbers over time. For this reason, we have opted to include year dummy variables in our
models of the test scores.
123 Data
The dependent variable in our analysis is the students’ score on a standardized multiple-choice
test called the Cito test. We use ﬁve years of test scores for the Cito test. More than 80% of
primary schools administer this test to pupils in the ﬁnal year of their primary education, which
is called group 8. The average age of these pupils is 12 years. The standardized test covers four
areas:
• Language: spelling, writing, reading, and vocabulary;
• Arithmetic: understanding of numbers, mental arithmetic, percentages, fractions, dealing with
measures, weights, money, and time;
• Information processing: use of texts, and other information sources, reading and understanding
of tables, graphs, and maps;
• World orientation (optional): applying knowledge in the ﬁelds of geography, history, biology,
science, and form of government.
The complete test consists of over 200 multiple-choice questions. There are ﬁve components to
the test. These ﬁve components include the four listed above, only reading is tested in a separate
component, and is not tested in the language component. The Cito test score total is made up of
four of the ﬁve components, with world orientation being left out. This is due to the fact that
world orientation is optional.
Testing takes place over a period of three days in February. The outcome of the test is
important for both pupils and schools. Pupils’ scores are used to help assign pupils to different
levels of secondary education. The average scores of schools’ pupils are also currently used to
judge the quality of primary schools. Parents use this information when choosing a primary
school for their children. Every year the test received considerable media attention, with national
newspapers and television reporting on the most recent results.
In this paper we use the test scores of all pupils in group 8 tested in 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002
and 2003. Our sample consists of approximately 720000 pupils in 6230 schools. The data set
includes the standardized total Cito test score as well as the component scores. We drop those
standardized scores which are lower than − 2.66, because we believe that many of these students
have special needs and in some primary schools are excluded from taking the Cito test. As a
result of this corrective measure, we exclude 3973 test scores from our analysis.2
We also exclude the world orientation test component from our analysis. Many schools do
not administer this component, because it is optional. As a result these component scores are
less likely to adequately reﬂect the general school population.
2 Results obtained without excluding these 3973 test scores indicate that our results are not effected by their exclusion.
13Our main explanatory variables are the school inspections. As discussed in the previous section,
there are two types of inspections: a shorter version (RST) and a longer version (IST). The IST
inspection has also been performed on a random sample of schools (RIST). At the individual
level, we have information on the gender of the student. At the school level, we have information
about the number of students from each school who took part in the Cito test in each year. This
provides a measure of the school size. Also available at the school level in each year are the
shares of the school student body that fall into each one of ﬁve categories created by law and
used to determine the level funding of each school by the government. Each category is
determined by the socioeconomic background of the parents and is used to determine the amount
of money a school receives for a certain pupil via a weighting factor. For example, a school
receives 25% more funds for pupils of poorly educated Dutch parents. The government allocates
90% more funds for the children of poorly educated parents from an ethnic minority. The share
of pupils belonging to these categories allows us to control for demographic effects that
inﬂuence the overall performance potential of each school.
Table 3.1 lists the means and standard deviations of the variables we use in our analysis. The
ﬁrst column reports the means for the entire sample. The slight increase in the score means and
decline in the standard deviations is caused by the exclusion of the lower tail implied by
dropping pupils with CITO test score totals below -2.66. The three remaining columns
correspond to the means obtained for schools subject to a RST, an IST, and a RIST inspection.
The means are calculated using the data from the year in which the inspections took place. The
column for the IST inspections represents the means obtained for both the randomly and
non-randomly selected schools.
The results indicate that the measured characteristics of each group of schools that received
one of the three inspection types closely mirror those found for the entire sample. The lower test
score means for all IST inspections is, however, worth mentioning. This is an indication that
inspectors tended to visit relatively poorly performing schools more often with the
IST-instrument.
14Table 3.1 Means for entire sample and randomly inspected schools, 1999-2003
Variable School Group
All RST All IST RIST
Cito test score
Total 0.02 0.01 − 0.04 − 0.01
(standard deviation) (0.98) (0.98) (0.99) (0.98)
Arithmetic 0.01 0.01 − 0.04 − 0.01
(standard deviation) (0.99) (0.99) (1.00) (0.99)
Language 0.01 0.01 − 0.04 − 0.01
(standard deviation) (0.98) (0.98) (0.99) (0.99)
Information 0.02 0.01 − 0.04 − 0.01
(standard deviation) (0.98) (0.98) (1.00) (0.99)
Reading 0.01 0.01 − 0.03 − 0.01
(standard deviation) (0.98) (0.98) (1.00) (0.99)
Socioeconomic index
1 (least disadvantaged) 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11
2 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.27
3 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.32
4 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.13
5 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09
6 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
7 (most disadvantaged) 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04
School denomination
Public 0.33 0.32 0.36 0.35
Catholic 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.30
Protestant 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30
Montessori/Dalton 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Other 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Urbanization school area
Very High 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.13
High 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.18
Modest 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.20
Low 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.27
Rural 0.24 0.25 0.20 0.21
Funding weights
1.0 0.719 0.709 0.693 0.703
1.25 0.153 0.166 0.158 0.162
1.4 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
1.7 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
1.9 0.124 0.121 0.146 0.132
School size 223.8 217.5 227.1 224.0
Number Cito per school 24.83 24.99 25.35 24.61
% girls 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49
% missing gender 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Sample size = N 716010 105956 37378 20135
School measurements 28518 4437 1493 816
15164 Empirical strategy
To determine the effect of school inspections on primary schools it would be convenient if the
inspected schools were randomly selected. Unfortunately this is not likely to have been the case.
It is therefore probable that the inspections and the unobserved heterogeneity in the test scores
are correlated. For example, it may well be the case that school inspections occurred
predominately at poorly performing schools. If this is the case, then school quality and the
inspections will be negatively correlated. As a result, a simple regression of Cito test scores on
the set of dummy variables covering the history of school inspections will produce negatively
biased estimates.
We use two approaches to overcome this type of bias. The ﬁrst approach is to use a standard
ﬁxed effects model. The second approach exploits a random sample created by the Dutch
Inspectorate of Education for compiling the annual report on the state of Dutch education. In
both approaches, we essentially compare the improvement in test scores following a certain type
of inspection with the change in test scores over the same period at those schools where this type
of inspection did not take place. In the ﬁrst approach, we focus on both types of inspections. In
the second type, we compare the performance of schools in the random sample with the
performance of the other schools.
Analyzing all school inspections using a ﬁxed effects model is feasible, because we have
pupil test scores measuring school performance before the inspections took place. Our second
approach, based on the inspections at randomly selected schools, does not require this data. The
disadvantage of this latter approach, however, is that there are fewer inspections to analyze. As a
result, there is more uncertainty about the estimates based on the random sample of inspections.
4.1 First approach
The ﬁrst approach, using a standard ﬁxed effects model, assumes that there is only correlation
between the inspections and the time-invariant components of the unobserved heterogeneity.
Provided school quality remains essentially constant over the course of the sample period, the
ﬁxed effects method will eliminate the problem of bias due to variation in schools quality.
We base our analysis on univariate models for the four test score components and the Cito
test total. These models are of the following form:
yijt = I0
jt β +X0
ijtδ +vj +εijt, (4.1)
Here, yijt is the Cito score for one the ﬁve components of the Cito test or the test score total over
time, where i = 1,...,Njt is the index used to designate the individual student, j = 1,...,S
denotes the school, and t = 1,...,T time, which in this case is the year. The test score is
assumed to be a linear function of the treatment variables, the control variables, and the two
17residual terms vj +εijt. The vector Ijt consists of the treatment variables, while the vector Xijt is
the set of explanatory variables. The effect of the inspections is given by the parameter vector β.
The vector δ corresponds to the vector of effects of the control variables. The residual consist of
a school effect vj, and the disturbance term εijt. The disturbance term εijt is assumed to be
independently and identically distributed with mean zero and variance σ2
ε .
The treatment variable vector Ijt is made up of variables derived from the primary school
inspection history. The term I0
jt β in (4.1) can be written out as follows.
I0
jt β = I1jtβ1+I2jtβ2+I3jtβ3+I4jtβ4. (4.2)
The four variables I1jt, I2jt, I3jt, and I4jt on the right hand side are dummy variables. The
variable I1jt indicates whether or not there was an inspection at school j a year ago (in the year
t −1). For example if yijt represents the Cito test score administered in February 2001, then
t = 2001. In this case a value of I1j2001 = 1 indicates that the school j was inspected sometime
during the year 2000. Similarly, the variables I2jt, I3jt, I4jt indicate whether or not there was a
random inspection at school j two years ago, three years ago, and four years ago, respectively.
In the deﬁnition of these variables, we make no distinction between the various types of
inspections. This means we assume that the RST and IST both have the same effect on school
performance.
In order to be able to obtain unbiased estimates for the elements of the parameter vector β in
(4.1) using the ﬁxed effects method, the treatment vector Ijt and the residual term εijt must be
uncorrelated: cov(Ijt,εijt) = 0. In the case of the non-random IST and the RST inspections, we
do not know how the inspection service selected which schools were to be inspected. We cannot
therefore rule out the possibility that inspectors tended to visit certain types of schools more than
others. If inspectors were more likely to visit weaker schools, then the correlation between Ijt,
and the school effect vj would result in a negative bias in the estimated values.
Note that our data does not permit us to follow individuals over time as is typically the case
in a panel. Each year the students in the data set leave primary school and therefore do not
reappear the following year. As a result the school effect vj is the only source of serial
correlation in the test scores.
We also use a second ﬁxed effects model which we obtain by relaxing the assumption that
the IST and RST inspections have the same effect. This leads to model (4.3).
yijt = RST0
jt ˆ β + ˆ IST
0
jt ˜ β +X0
ijtδ +vj +εijt (4.3)
Here we have that
RST0




jt β = ˆ IST1jt ˜ β1+ ˆ IST2jt ˜ β2+ ˆ IST3jt ˜ β3+ ˆ IST4jt ˜ β4. (4.5)
18The dummy variable RSTk jt, k = 1,...,4 indicates whether school j in the year t had an RST
inspection k years ago. ˆ ISTk jt is deﬁned similarly for IST inspections (at both the randomly
selected and the non-randomly selected schools).
We note that all versions of our model include dummy control variables for the IST
inspections carried out in 1998. We have no test score available before these interventions took
place. For this reason, the effect of these inspections after one year (in 1999) ends up in the ﬁxed
effect term vj of those schools which were inspected in 1998. We therefore include control
dummy variable for the IST inspections from 1998 for the additional effect of these inspections
after two, three, four, and ﬁve years. This means that we are unable to measure the total effect of
these inspections on school performance. We have therefore opted not to report them.
4.2 Second approach
The second approach we use to overcome the potential problem of selection bias is based on a
random sample created by the Inspectorate of Education for compiling the annual report of the
state of Dutch education. This random sample provides an experimental group of schools at
which school inspections are held. All other schools form the control group. We compare the
outcomes of schools in the experimental and control groups in the years following the school
inspections. By creating a random sample of schools to be inspected, the Dutch Inspectorate of
education is actually performing a controlled experiment.
To be able to obtain estimates based on the IST inspections at randomly selected schools, we
deﬁne dummy variables for all three types of inspections. To do this we split the dummy variable
ˆ IST jt into the variables ISTjt and RISTjt. This model version is given in (4.6).
yijt = RST0
jt ˆ β +IST0
jt ˜ β +RIST0
jt β†+X0
ijtδ +vj +εijt. (4.6)
Here the dummy variable ISTjt represents the inspection history of the IST inspections at the
non-randomly selected schools, and the variable RISTjt is based on the history of the IST
inspections at the randomly selected schools. These dummy variables are deﬁned in the same
manner as in (4.2). There are, however, only three dummy variables in the vector RISTjt,
because we have no information on these inspections for the year 2002, see table 2.1.
By specifying a ﬁxed effects model in terms of the intervention variables RSTjt, ISTjt, and
RISTjt, we can not only check whether the RST and IST inspections produce similar
improvements in school performance, but we can also check for the presence of bias in our
estimates. If the dummy variables RSTjt and ISTjt are correlated with the disturbance term εijt,
the estimates for the parameters ˆ β and ˜ β will be biased. The estimates for the effect of school
inspection based on the inspections performed at the randomly inspected schools, β† should be
free from this bias. The fact that the school were randomly selected ensures that RISTjt will be
independent of εijt.
19The estimates of ˜ β and β† are both measures of the effect of IST inspections on school
performance. It would therefore be reasonable to expect that these parameters be equal. If the
estimates are different, this may be an indication that there is some correlation between the time
varying heterogeneity, disturbance term εijt, and the IST inspections at the non-randomly
selected schools. In the following section, we present the estimation results we obtained for the
ﬁxed effects models presented above.
205 Results
We present the estimated effects of school inspections in the tables 5.1 to 5.5. In the presentation
of our results, we adopt the notation of three asterisks to denote an estimate that is signiﬁcant at
the 0.1% level, two asterisks to denote an estimate that is signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and one
asterisk at the 5% level. The standard error is shown below each estimate in parentheses. The
results are grouped by Cito test component, with one table for each component. We report only
the estimates we obtained for the model with control variables. The control variables included
are the school size, socioeconomic index, funding weights, and number of cito test scores
administered, as well as the ratio of the number of test scores administered to the school size,
and gender. For details on these variables see table 3.1. The results for the model without control
variables are essentially the same. We have chosen not to reproduce the results for the model
without control variables to avoid presenting too many tables.
In each table we list the estimated effects of the different types of inspections. The ﬁrst row
reports the combined effect of all school inspections bundled together. The estimates in this row
are based on (4.1) in which we assume that the effect of the school inspections is the same
regardless of the type of inspection. The second row shows the estimates for the RST
inspections. These estimates are based on (4.3). In the last two rows we report the estimates for
the IST inspections. The third row is based on all IST inspections performed at both the
randomly, as well as the non-randomly selected schools in (4.3). The last row lists the estimates
for the randomly selected IST, or the RIST inspections. These results were obtained using (4.6).
The ﬁrst table 5.1 lists the estimation results we obtained based on the Cito test total score.
The estimates of the effects of the RST inspections, ˆ β, as well as those for all IST inspections, ˜ β,
are highly signiﬁcant in the two years following an these inspections. This is also true of the
estimates for the combined effect of all inspections β. Although the estimates obtained for the
IST inspections at randomly selected schools, β† are not signiﬁcantly different from zero, they
are positive in the ﬁrst two years following an inspection. It is important to note that the standard
errors for the estimates of β† are nearly double those for β. This is due to the smaller number of
inspections at randomly selected schools. This makes it more difﬁcult to ﬁnd an effect that is
signiﬁcantly different from zero.
An important feature of these results is that all our estimates are positive. The mean squared
error of our estimates increases with the elapsed time since an inspection. This is due to the
decreased number of inspections that are available to identify these estimates. In the case of ˆ β4
and ˜ β4 these estimates are only based on the inspections in the year 1999. This contrasts with the
estimates for ˆ β1 and ˜ β1, which are based on the inspections in the four years over the period of
1999 to 2002. This increase in the standard error as the time elapsed since an inspection grows,
means that it is increasingly difﬁcult to accurately measure the effect of an inspection in our
sample as the time elapsed since an inspection grows. We can not rule out the possibility
21therefore that there is a positive effect in each year following an inspection, but that we are
unable to measure this effect with sufﬁcient precision to demonstrate this. This hypothesis is
supported by the fact that the estimates of ˜ β are also signiﬁcant in the fourth year.
We can also see from the tables that the estimates of ˜ β are larger than those for ˆ β. This
suggests that the more intensive IST inspections lead to a larger improvement in test score than
the shorter RST inspections.
As is typical for all our estimates, regardless of which test component they are based on, the
model speciﬁcation does not seem to signiﬁcantly effect the estimates we obtain. This suggests
that our results are robust to changes in model speciﬁcation.
Table 5.1 Estimated Effect of School Inspections on Cito Test Totala
Type of Inspection Time elapsed since inspection
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
β1 β2 β3 β4
All inspections (β in 4.1) 0.019∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.009 0.013
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
ˆ β1 ˆ β2 ˆ β3 ˆ β4
RST inspections ( ˆ β in 4.3) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.009 0.007
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
˜ β1 ˜ β2 ˜ β3 ˜ β4
All IST inspections ( ˜ β in 4.3) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.016 0.039∗∗





Random IST inspections (β† in 4.6) 0.005 0.006 0.000
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
a The control variables are the school size, socioeconomic index, funding weights, and number of cito test scores administered, and the
ratio of the number of test scores to the school size, and gender.
The estimates based on the arithmetic test component show the largest increases in school
performance following an inspection. Table 5.2 gives these estimates. The estimates of the effect
of all inspections, β, of the RST inspections, ˆ β, and of all IST inspections ˜ β are signiﬁcantly
different from zero in all years. The estimates for the effect from the RIST inspections, β† are
not generally signiﬁcantly different from zero, although β
†
2 is. The β† are, however, all positive.
Once again, it is also the case that the standard errors of the β† are also higher, indicating that it
is more difﬁcult to accurately measure the effect of these inspections, because there are fewer of
them.
Table 5.3 lists the estimates based on the language test component. These estimates show
improvements of all the test components in the ﬁrst two years following an inspection. The table
for the estimates based on the information test component, table 5.4, as well as the one based on
22Table 5.2 Estimated Effect of School Inspections on Cito Test Arithmetica
Type of Inspection Time elapsed since inspection
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
β1 β2 β3 β4
All inspections (β in 4.1) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
ˆ β1 ˆ β2 ˆ β3 ˆ β4
RST inspections ( ˆ β in 4.3) 0.025∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.025∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
˜ β1 ˜ β2 ˜ β3 ˜ β4
All IST inspections ( ˜ β in 4.3) 0.037∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗





Random IST inspections (β† in 4.6) 0.007 0.021∗ 0.021
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
a The control variables are the school size, socioeconomic index, funding weights, and number of cito test scores administered, and the
ratio of the number of test scores to the school size, and gender.
Table 5.3 Estimated Effect of School Inspections on Cito Test Languagea
Type of Inspection Time elapsed since inspection
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
β1 β2 β3 β4
All inspections (β in 4.1) 0.011∗∗ 0.011∗ − 0.005 − 0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
ˆ β1 ˆ β2 ˆ β3 ˆ β4
RST inspections ( ˆ β in 4.3) 0.009∗ 0.015∗ − 0.004 − 0.009
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
˜ β1 ˜ β2 ˜ β3 ˜ β4
All IST inspections ( ˜ β in 4.3) 0.020∗∗∗ 0.005 − 0.002 0.015





Random IST inspections (β† in 4.6) 0.005 0.000 − 0.012
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
a The control variables are the school size, socioeconomic index, funding weights, and number of cito test scores administered, and the
ratio of the number of test scores to the school size, and gender.
the reading test component, table 5.5, show a largely similar pattern. The estimates for the
information component and the language component tend to be smaller, while those for the
reading component tend to be somewhat larger. There is, in fact, only one negative estimate in
23the table for the reading component, whereas the table for the information component contains
ﬁve negative estimates.
Table 5.4 Estimated Effect of School Inspections on Cito Test Informationa
Type of Inspection Time elapsed since inspection
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
β1 β2 β3 β4
All inspections (β in 4.1) 0.012∗∗ 0.014∗ − 0.002 0.005
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
ˆ β1 ˆ β2 ˆ β3 ˆ β4
RST inspections ( ˆ β in 4.3) 0.011∗ 0.017∗∗ − 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
˜ β1 ˜ β2 ˜ β3 ˜ β4
All IST inspections ( ˜ β in 4.3) 0.017∗∗ 0.010 0.001 0.025





Random IST inspections (β† in 4.6) − 0.004 − 0.014 − 0.019
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013)
a The control variables are the school size, socioeconomic index, funding weights, and number of cito test scores administered, and the
ratio of the number of test scores to the school size, and gender.
Table 5.5 Estimated Effect of School Inspections on Cito Test Readinga
Type of Inspection Time elapsed since inspection
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
β1 β2 β3 β4
All inspections (β in 4.1) 0.013∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.001 0.013
(0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
ˆ β1 ˆ β2 ˆ β3 ˆ β4
RST inspections ( ˆ β in 4.3) 0.013∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.000 0.007
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011)
˜ β1 ˜ β2 ˜ β3 ˜ β4
All IST inspections ( ˜ β in 4.3) 0.017∗∗ 0.017∗ 0.008 0.039∗∗





Random IST inspections (β† in 4.6) 0.010 0.002 0.004
(0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
a The control variables are the school size, socioeconomic index, funding weights, and number of cito test scores administered, and the
ratio of the number of test scores to the school size, and gender.
24In general, the results follow a number of patterns. Firstly, the estimates for the IST inspections,
˜ β are the largest, and those for the IST inspections at randomly selected schools, β† are the
smallest. Those for the RST, ˆ β, and for all inspections, β, lie in between.
Secondly, the measured effects three and four year after the inspections are typically not
signiﬁcantly different from zero, and, particularly for the language and information components,
can be negative. However, all estimates also follow a third pattern: that of increasing mean
squared errors as time elapses following an inspection. We can therefore not rule out the
possibility that the inspections do produce permanent improvements in school performance, but
that we do not have a sufﬁciently long sample period to be able to demonstrate this. It is worth
noting, for example, that there is not a single negative estimate in the tables to be found that is
also signiﬁcantly different from zero.
In general, the tables make clear that the most dramatic improvements in test scores
following an inspection are to be found for the arithmetic test component. These improvements
are positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero for all four years or all parameter estimates with
the exception of two of the three values for β†.
25266 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate whether inspections by the Dutch Inspectorate of Education lead to
an improvement of test scores. It should be noted that we did not investigate the effect of the
existence of the Dutch Inspectorate of Education. In the Dutch education system any school can
be visited by schools inspectors and the threat of an inspection may have an impact on school
performance. Our analysis only focuses on the effect of the school visits by inspectors and their
follow-up activities. To avoid selection bias by inspectors choosing schools to visit, we use two
approaches for estimating the effects of school inspections. The ﬁrst approach is to use a
standard ﬁxed effects model. The second approach exploits a sample of randomly selected
schools originally drawn for the purpose of compiling the annual report of the state of Dutch
education.
Our main ﬁnding with the ﬁrst approach is that school inspections lead to better performance
of schools. In the ﬁrst two years following an inspection test scores increase by 2% to 3% of a
standard deviation. Our analysis also indicates that the more intensive inspections produce larger
improvements in school performance than the less intensive ones.
The improvement in Dutch elementary schools is strongest in the area of arithmetic and
persists over the four years following an inspection. For the three other subject areas covered by
the Cito test and for the test score total, the improvement is signiﬁcant in the two years following
an inspection. Thereafter, the estimated effects are typically positive and of similar magnitude to
those in the ﬁrst two years, but not signiﬁcant.
For the second approach based on the random sample drawn by the Dutch Inspectorate of
Education, we only ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects for the arithmetic component of the Cito test.
However, the estimates for the other test components are consistent with the overall results based
on all the school inspections. The estimates are positive in the ﬁrst two years following an
inspection, and all estimates are positive and larger for the arithmetic component than for the
other components. The small number of inspections in the random sample reduces the statistical
power in the second approach which may explain the insigniﬁcant results.
Why does the ﬁrst approach yield larger results than the second approach? One possible
explanation is be that the nonrandom inspections might more often be targeted at schools with
greater potential for improvement. In this case, we would expect that there are more schools that
do not beneﬁt from the recommendations of the Inspectorate in the random sample.
Nonrandomly selected schools would then on average show more improvement than the
randomly chosen ones in the second approach. This is related to the distinction made in the
evaluation literature between average treatment effects and average treatment effects on the
treated, see for instance Cameron and Trivedi (2005). The difference between the ﬁrst and
second approach could be caused by the difference between these two treatment effects.
We conclude that both approaches indicate positive effects of school inspections on
27achievements of pupils in primary education. If school visits of two to three days improve test
scores by 2% to 3% of a standard deviation, this seems a very cost-effective intervention
compared to other interventions. For instance, in the famous Star experiment in Tennessee a
class size reduction of seven pupils for four years increased average test scores between 10% and
20% of a standard deviation. Although the beneﬁts of the class size intervention are larger, the
cost is also likely to be greater. Reducing class sizes by seven pupils involves increasing the
teacher labor force by approximately one third for four years; the cost of a school inspection and
report by inspectors is a fraction of this cost. Our estimates in the second approach are smaller
than 2% to 3%, but even with very small improvements of test scores the beneﬁt-cost ratio of
school inspections compares favorably to class size reduction.
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